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Abstract
A two period labor market is considered in which workers’ quality is revealed in the
second period. A signal – revealed to either workers, firms or both at the beginning
of the first period – is correlated with the final quality. Under all assumptions about
the distribution of information in the first period there exists an equilibrium in which
firms only make offers in the second period and workers accept no offer in the first period.
Nonetheless, early contracting is also an equilibrium if certain conditions on preferences of
firms and workers are met. Workers have to be risk averse or firms risk loving with respect
to expectations appropriate to the relevant information structure. Thus the conditions
for unraveling depend on the information available to the two sides of the market.
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1 Introduction
Most markets are open more or less continuously, and unless a market is particularly thin,
agents can participate in transactions whenever they wish. The timing of transactions is thus
not an issue in itself. Some markets, however, are characterized by their periodic nature, that
is transactions are to take place within specified periods of time which are separated by possi-
bly lengthy periods of market inactivity. This constraint may make the timing of transactions
a strategic variable, in particular when timing decisions affect the quality or quantity of goods
or services available. In some cases, there is a strong tendency for transactions to take place
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ever earlier, even predating the official start of the trading period.
Roth and Xing (1994) provide a detailed survey of a large number of markets where un-
raveling, that is the move of transactions to increasingly earlier dates, has occurred. Many
of those markets are for entry level professional positions, such as medical doctors, lawyers
and junior university appointments. Admission into top level colleges also seems to have been
moving towards earlier deadlines as admission officials attempt to secure the most promis-
ing students. Moreover, they report a rising number of basketball players that are recruited
straight from high-school without the once customary delay of college training and experience.
While these examples are concentrated in the human resource arena, Roth and Xing (1994)
also show that early contracting is a problem in the planning of post-season football games. As
an indication that unraveling is not a new concern, they quote medieval legislation outlawing
the buying and selling before the official start of periodic goods markets.
Periodic markets – and participants in markets – might suffer for unraveling. This has to
do with the purpose of the market institution itself. By providing a well-specified time and
location – not necessarily in terms of geographical space – in which buyers and sellers can
interact, a market coordinates supply and demand, reduces search and transaction costs and
increases the information available to the participants. Since unraveling moves a significant
proportion of the transactions outside of the market, it impedes this coordinating function
and, in extreme cases, may lead to its dissolution. Another problem arises when unraveling
causes trades being executed before all information becomes known. If information is revealed
over time, ex-post efficiency requires that agents wait as long as possible before they trade.
Early trades therefore cannot be ex-post efficient. In general, observers and participants in
markets agree on this, and attempts are often made to reverse the trend and implement bind-
ing transactions dates. In some cases these are adhered to, in others, however, the incentive
to contract early seems to be too large. Indeed, risk aversion and uncertainty, for example
on the potential output, provide incentives to agents on early contracting. Unraveling can be
seen as an insurance phenomenon and a risk sharing attitude. The desirability of unraveling
is ambiguous and the role of information seems to be a crucial component. At the same time,
Roth and Xing (1994) observe, unraveling is not a universal phenomenon. Indeed, there are
many markets where the contract procedures and dates are stable and market participants
seem to have no interest in moving early. It is thus reasonable to ask how market institutions
or the (behavioral) characteristics of the participants in a market affect the timing decision.
This paper attempts to cast some light on the role of information and risk attitude in
the unraveling process. The importance of risk aversion and insurance in unraveling has been
pointed out before in theoretical economics.1
1Other theoretical explanations of this phenomenon are available in the literature. Damiano et al. (2005)
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In most of them the labor market is investigated, where firms and workers match pairwise
in order to produce output. Matching is possible in two periods and uncertainty, introduced in
several different ways, is resolved just prior to the second trading period. Li and Rosen (1998),
for example, assume that workers are unproductive with a certain probability while firms are
always productive. This individual uncertainty introduces aggregate risk about the relative
supply of productive labor in the second period and, in consequence, about the distribution
of output between workers and firms. In the unique equilibrium, workers that are productive
with high probability contract early while the others prefer to wait for the second-period spot
market.2
Li and Suen (2004) augment Li and Rosen (1998)’s model to allow for unproductive firms.
Since aggregate uncertainty is necessary to induce early contracting, they introduce a random
shock to the number of workers in the second period. Multiple equilibria with early contracting
are possible due to the non-monotone relationship between the number of early contracts and
the probability of being on the long side of the spot-market. This non-monotonicity is caused
by the uncertainty over firms’ productivity and workers that are more likely to be productive
being matched earlier. The higher the uncertainty regarding the number of productive workers
in the second period and the more risk-averse workers and firms are, the larger becomes the
number of worker-firm pairs that contract early. Restricting the ability of agents to set the
distribution of output negotiated in the first period is found to reduce unraveling.
Abandoning the assumption of binary productivity, Li and Suen (2000) examine a model
where production is a function of both workers’ and firms’ quality. Two sided uncertainty
is introduced through a continuous distribution of productivity. In equilibrium, matching
in the second period is positive assortative in the sense that higher productivity workers are
matched with higher productivity firms and output is shared.3 Since quality is not known with
certainty in the first period, early contracting cannot be assortative and reduces the variation
of production agents expect albeit at the cost of lower expected output. As in the case of Li
and Suen (2004) and Li and Rosen (1998), agents that have a higher expected productivity
have a greater incentive to contract early.
Suen (2000) shows that unraveling does not have to start at the top of the type distri-
bution. Productivity is again distributed continuously and final production depends on the
quality of both the firm and worker in the final matching. While firm productivity is known
by all agents, in the first period the quality of workers is unknown to firms and workers alike.
With this set-up and endogenous division of final output, Suen (2000) finds that only mediocre
analyze the effect of costly search, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) determine the link between disclosure in-
formation and early contracting, Halaburda (2010) shows that similarity of preferences might lead to early
contracting and Fainmesser (2011) investigates how social networks affect the unraveling process.
2Output is assumed to be claimed by the side of the market that is in short supply in the spot market. By
contracting early, workers and firms can agree to a division of output, removing the risk associated with being
on the long side of the market.
3See, for example, Becker (1981).
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firms have an incentive to contract early. Highly productive firms prefer to wait until workers’
productivity is known in order to attain a best possible matching. Low-productivity firms
cannot afford the wage demands of workers of ex-ante average workers.
Since most of the unraveling seems to occur in labor markets, this focus on matching seems
appropriate. Contrary to Suen (2000) and Li and Suen (2000, 2004), in our model, firms and
workers do not match in order to produce output. In all these papers early contracting, even
given risk aversion, is always related to the distribution of productivity. We investigate a
general framework to analyze the role of asymmetric information and risk attitude on early
contracting. In our work preferences are common, but there is uncertainty over the quality
of agents which is only resolved in the second period. Unlike previous work, preferences are
over ranks rather than the quality of agents.4 This complicates the analysis significantly. In a
recent paper, Halaburda (2010) shows that similarity of preferences might drive the unraveling
process. Yet, she considers a different setting than ours, using a mechanism design approach.
In our paper every agent (firms and workers) has the ability to compare the quality of
workers if they know the quality of the workers. We consider three different assumptions
about the information structure of the game and their effect on the matching process exam-
ined. Either both sides are informed by a cumulative distribution function on a signal about
the quality of the workers or only one side gets this information. An informed agent is then
able to compute the ranking probabilities for each worker. In the second period, the quality of
workers becomes common knowledge. As a consequence, the set of mixed strategies profiles for
firms and workers are related to the information structure. That defines the set of probability
profiles made by firms and workers, depending on the firms’ quality and their expectations on
the resulting workers’ expected quality in the second period. Under all three paradigms there
exists an equilibrium in which firms only make offers in the second period and workers accept
no offer in the first period. However, these equilibria rely on weakly dominated strategies and
so are not trembling hand perfect equilibria. As a consequence, unraveling is found to be a
possibility in all three information structure. The generality of the model and the very nature
of the matching process will preclude very detailed predictions but point to the importance of
preferences and information. We determine that early contracting is an equilibrium if workers
are risk averse or firms risk loving with respect to expectations appropriate to the relevant
information structure. Thus the conditions of unraveling depend on the information available
to the two sides of the market given identical preferences.
In Section 2, we introduce notations, define the assumptions on preferences, the matching
market and ranking functions. In Section 3, we define the different possible set of available
4This assumption is relevant in many matching situations. For example, graduate schools select students
on ranks made from their previous degrees. An another example is the labor market for lawyers in Germany.
Companies decide to interview new lawyers through their grades in a National exam (named Staatsexamen).
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information and then investigate the matching market. We determine an equilibrium where
there is no match at the first period. Finally, in Section 4, we find out conditions such as early
contracting is also an equilibrium for all information structures.
2 Preliminaries
Firms and workers meet in a two period job market. Firms can hire at most one worker
and workers can accept no more than one position. Job offers can be made by firms in both
periods. If a worker accepts an offer in the first period, the offer is binding and both the firm
and the worker exit the job market prior to the second period. Offers do not carry over from
the first to the second period, that is, a worker has to accept or decline an offer in the period
it is made.5 Workers cannot propose job offers.
The ranking of firms is common knowledge; the ranking of workers, in contrast, becomes
common knowledge between the first and second period in which the market operates. This
assumption reflects several characteristics of many actual job markets, in particular for entry
level positions. In most cases, the amount of public information about potential employers
far exceeds the information available about job seekers.6 The revelation of information about
employees is intended to model the process of unraveling: contracting early implies contracting
with less information. Three assumptions are made about the information available in the first
period. In the first scenario, both workers and firms receive a signal about workers’ rankings.
In two other cases the information structure is asymmetric and either workers or firms receive
the signal. Both assumptions can be justified with respect to actual market situations. On one
hand it can be claimed that agents possess more information about themselves than outside
observers do. On the other hand, applicants may lack knowledge about their competitors’
quality and therefore their own ranking, while firms have experience in hiring and may be
able to rank candidates with some accuracy.
Firms and workers have identical preferences regarding their respective potential matches.
While this is clearly an oversimplification, it has the advantage of allowing the analysis to focus
on the effects of early contracting. Since common preferences imply the existence of a unique
stable matching in the second period market, any stable matching mechanism will result in
the same final matching. The precise nature of the second period market will therefore not
affect the results obtained. While this assumption might not hold very well in practice, there
does seem to be at least some agreement over which employers or workers are more desirable
in most actual labor markets.
In order to set up the model properly, some notation is needed. Let I = {1, . . . , I} be the
set of firms and N = {1, . . . , N} the set of workers attempting to match in the job market.
5In the terminology of Niederle and Roth (2009), offers are exploding.
6The academic job market, where the ranking of universities is widely published, is a particularly extreme
example of this phenomenon.
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Denote by s2 the quality vector of workers and S2 the set of all possible such vectors. Let
s1 ∈ S1 be a vector of signal for s2. This vector of signals could be known by agents. Yet,
workers or firms could only known the cumulative distribution function of s1, G : S1 → [0, 1],
and its associated density function g. The conditional distribution and density functions for
worker quality given s1 ∈ S1 are mapping F (.|s1) and f(.|s1) from S2 to [0, 1]. The nth
element of s2 is s2n. Moreover, agents could compare the quality of workers with a ranking
function if they knew the quality vector. Let us define the ranking functions.
Definition 1. Let r a common knowledge mapping such that for all i, j ∈ N r(s2i ) ≤ r(s2j )
if and only if s2i ≤ s2j . Additionally, we define a common knowledge ranking function r(s2)
which set all permutations of {r(s21), ..., r(s2N )} such that
r(s2) = (r(s2i ), ..., r(s
2
k)) for 1 ≤ i, k ≤ N, i 6= k
= (rN , ..., r1) with rN ≥ .... ≥ r1.
Given a vector of signals s1 and the conditional distribution of s1, the probabilities of a
worker n to be ranking as the kth better worker can be found.
Definition 2. The individual conditional cumulative distribution function of the worker n to
be rank as the kth for every k ∈ N is defined as
Fn(rk|s1) =
∫
S
f(r(s)|s1)ds
where S =
{
s2 ∈ S2|r(s2n) ≤ rk
}
. Its associated density, the individual conditional distribution
function of the worker n to be rank as the kth, is defined as
fn(rk|s1) =
∫
S
f(r(s)|s1)ds
where S =
{
s2 ∈ S2|r(s2n) = rk
}
.
The ranking of workers depends on their quality parameter s2. Without loss of generality,
and for the purpose of consistency between s2 and r(.), it is postulated that workers with
a higher quality parameter are ranked higher. From the conditional distribution of s2 it
is possible to calculate the probability that a particular worker attains a specific rank once
her quality becomes known.7 Due to the nature of the ranking function, the ranking of an
individual worker depends on the quality of all workers. The definition of the individual
conditional distribution function takes this into account.
In contrast, the ranking of firms is common knowledge. The quality ranking of firms is
a function q =
{
q1, q2, . . . , q|I|
}
from the set of firms I to the set of all permutations on
{1, 2, . . . , |I|}, such that qi is the ranking of firm i.
7The ranking function translates a continuous density of qualities into a discrete distribution of rankings.
It is monotone but not continuous.
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Assumption 1. The ranking of firms q =
{
q1, q2, . . . , q|I|
}
is such as q|I| ≥ ... ≥ q2 ≥ q1.
A matching of firms and workers assigns a single worker to every firm. Unmatched agents
are assumed to be matched to themselves.
Definition 3. A matching µ for firms and workers is a mapping from I ∪ N onto itself of
order two such that,
1. |µ(i)| = |µ(n)| = 1
2. µ(i) ∈ N or µ(i) = i for all i ∈ I
3. µ(n) ∈ I or µ(n) = n for all n ∈ N
This definition is the usual one for matching models (see for example Roth and Sotomayor
(1990)). A firm (worker) could be match with only one worker (firm). The second (respectively
the third) item means that all firms (workers) are matched, either with a worker or with herself.
Preferences are represented by utility functions u and v for workers and firms, respectively.
Neither firms nor workers receive utility from the quality of their match; instead they are only
interested in obtaining a partner of the highest possible rank. This assumption deviates
from the literature where productivity tends to be the crucial characteristic. It is somewhat
motivated by job markets, where positions often cannot be held over between years and
competition between firms may make them more sensitive to relative quality or ranking of
job candidates than overall quality.8 Since firms and workers are homogeneous except for
their quality and ranking, it is convenient to refer to a particular firm i or worker n by its
quality or ranking, such that rn refers to both a ranking and the worker for which r(s2n) = rn.9
Assumption 2. Firms and workers have identical utility functions, ui(.) ≡ u(.) and vn(.) ≡
v(.), which are common knowledge.
Assumption 3. Both workers and firms prefer to be matched to higher ranked agents, v(qi) ≥
v(qj) whenever qj ≤ qi and u(rm) ≥ u(rn) whenever rn ≤ rm. Being unmatched is the least
preferred outcome, v(n) < mini{v(qi)} and u(i) < minn{u(rn)}.
3 The matching market
With these preliminaries the matching market can be described. The market consists of two
periods, t ∈ {1, 2}. At the beginning of t = 1 all agents are unmatched. A signal s1 is drawn
from the distribution G(S1) and is revealed either to all firms, all workers or both firms and
8This is not to suggest that the overall quality of candidates does not matter, but to highlight the importance
of ranking in some markets.
9All results could be establish if we would refer to a worker n by its ranking rk such that for which r(s2n) = rk.
The only difference is one do notation.
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workers depending on the information scenarios described below. All strategic action takes
place in the first period. Firms can make an offer to a single worker or not make any offer at
all; workers who receive at least one offer can accept one or decline all of them. Analogous to
the definition of a matching, firms who do not make an offer to a worker are treated as making
an offer to themselves. Thus the set of available actions for a firm i consists of the union of the
set of all workers, N , and itself, AIi = N ∪{i}. Similarly, the set of actions of a worker n is the
union of the set of firms, I and itself, ANn = I∪{n}. The set of mixed strategy profiles for firms
and workers depend on the information structure. If an offer is accepted, the matched pair is
removed from the market and a preliminary matching µ1 can be defined in which µ1(i) = n
for all firms i ∈ I whose offer to a worker n ∈ N has been accepted and µ1(n) = i for all
workers n ∈ N who have accepted an offer from a firm i ∈ I. All other agents are matched to
themselves: µ1(j) = j, ∀j ∈ I : µ1(j) /∈ N and µ1(m) = m, ∀m ∈ N : µ1(m) /∈ I.
The set of unmatched firms after period 1, I ′ is given by
I ′ = {i ∈ I|µ1(i) = i}
The set of unmatched workers after period 1, N ′ is given by
N ′ = {n ∈ N |µ1(n) = n}
In the second period, the quality of all workers s2 and hence their ranking r(s2) becomes
common knowledge. It is then possible to rank the firms and workers still in the market
relative to each other. In particular, let r′n be the nth element of r(s′) where s′ = s2 × J and
J is a |N | × |N ′| matrix that selects the signals for all workers in N ′ from s2. Similarly, q′
can be defined as the relative ranking of the firms in I ′. An external mechanism matches the
remaining firms and workers by rank. Let us assume that |N | ≥ |I|.10 In period 2,
1. for all n ∈ N ′ and ∃ i ∈ I ′ such that µ2(r′n) = q′i or µ2(r′n) = r′n
2. for all i ∈ I ′ and ∃ n ∈ N ′ such that µ2(q′i) = r′n or µ2(q′i) = q′i
3. µ2(k) = µ1(k) ∀k /∈ I ′ ∪N ′.
Remark 1. Assortative matching, that is matching agents by their rank, produces a stable
match when preferences on both sides of the market are common. Since this matching is
unique and since both rankings and the utility functions are common knowledge at t = 2, the
external mechanism is outcome equivalent to all stable matching mechanisms. The way in
which we consider the matching in period 2 is thus less restrictive than initially apparent. It
should be pointed out, however, that the final assignment of workers, µ = µ1×µ2, to firms need
not be stable. Although, by our setting (items 1, 2 and 3 before) there exists no worker-firm
10Which implies that |N ′| ≥ |I ′|.
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pair (i, n) where i ∈ I ′ and n ∈ N ′ that can block the matching, blocking by a pair that consists
of at least one member k /∈ I ′ ∪N ′ is not ruled out.11
The optimal strategy profile of both firms and workers in the first period depends on
their respective expectations about the match they can achieve in the second period. These
expectations, in turn, are contingent on the information available to the agents. Two infor-
mation structures are particularly appealing for their simplicity and practical importance. In
a symmetric structure, both firms and workers receive the quality signal vector s1. In two
asymmetric set-ups, either the workers or the firms obtain information about the signal vector.
Information Structure 1. The information structure is called symmetric if and only if the
vector of signals s1 is common knowledge.
While it is imaginable that in an actual job market firms have informations about all
applicants, the assumption that workers have information about each others’ attributes is
somewhat strong. Nonetheless, complete symmetry is convenient baseline case against which
to compare information structures.
In t = 1, a firm i used a mixed strategy vector σi, which can be defined as a probability
distribution over the set of feasible actions ai ∈ AIi as a function of the revealed signal s1,
σi(ai|s1). Similarly, the mixed strategy vector σn for a worker n describes a probability distri-
bution over the set of feasible actions an ∈ ANn , contingent on the realized signal s1, σn(an|s1).
In other words, firms make an offer to a particular worker with a certain probability which
depends on their own quality and the expected quality of the particular workers derived from
the signal s1. Workers accept one of the offers they potentially receive based on the realized
signal and the resulting expected quality in the second period.
Information Structure 2. The information structure is called asymmetric if and only if
one side of the market informed about the vector of signals s1. The other side knows only the
distribution G(.) of the vector of signals.
Here, two cases must be distinguished.
• In contrast to the symmetric information case, if a firm makes an early offer to a worker,
she has to form beliefs about the realization of s1 before deciding whether to accept or
not. Workers’ strategies in period 1 can thus no longer be conditional on the observed
signal and are given by σn for a worker n.
• Instead of firms, workers could obtain information about s1, while firms only know the
distribution function G(s1). Thus workers cannot make their strategies contingent on
the realized signal.
11Adapting the results from Galichon (2012) to our model, as matching in period 1 does not lead to an
ex-post efficient allocation it cannot lead to an ex-ante efficient allocation.
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With all that, the equilibrium behavior can be described.
Proposition 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in which firms make and workers accept no
offer in period 1, such as for all i ∈ I, n ∈ N and s1 ∈ S1
• Under symmetric information (Information Structure 1)
σi(i|s1) = 1
σn(n|s1) = 1
• If only firms know the vector signal s1 (Information Structure 2)
σi(i|s1) = 1
σn(n) = 1
• If only workers know the vector signal s1 (Information Structure 2)
σi(i) = 1
σn(n|s1) = 1
These equilibria are not trembling-hand perfect equilibria.
Proof. The proof is provided only for the Information Structure 1. Indeed the proof for
Information Structure 2 is similar with minor modifications.
All agents are matched in the second period, such that qi = rn. Since any first-period
offer by firm will be declined, a firm cannot raise its expected utility by contracting early. A
similar argument holds for workers.
Suppose each firm i makes an offer to a particular n worker with probability ni and
makes no offer at all with probability 1 −∑N ni . Then, the optimal strategy for a worker
is to play a completely mixed strategy σn in which an offer from a firm i such that u(qi) ≥∫
u(rn)1rn>|I|dFn(rn|s1) is accepted with the maximum probability allowed. As ni decreases,
this strategy does not change, ruling out a limit in which workers decline all offers in the first
period. 
Under symmetric information, the existence of an equilibrium in which both workers and
firms wait until the second period to be matched, seems to indicate that unraveling may not
be a problem in the type of job market described above. However, as the equilibrium is not
trembling-hand perfect, it is not clear that workers – if faced with an offer in period 1 – should
automatically refuse being matched before the second period. Intuitively, it makes no sense for
workers to decline a first-period offer from a firm which will generate a higher utility than can
be expected from being matched in the second period. This, in turn, implies that there may
exist a firm that prefers making an offer in period 1. In other words, the Nash equilibrium in
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which firms and workers never match in the first period relies on weakly dominated strategies
and is therefore not trembling-hand perfect. Without restrictions on preferences, it is never-
theless not possible to predict if there is in fact a worker-firm pair that will contract in the first
period or not. The conditions necessary to find a worker and a firm that can contract early
can be related to their respective risk attitude. Risk aversion by workers has been pointed out
as a factor in unraveling labor markets by other authors, but the risk attitude of firms can
play an equally important part. Furthermore, since rankings are discrete, and the number of
firms and workers is limited, risk aversion has to be strong enough for workers to accept an
offer from a firm that is ranked lower than the worker’s expected ranking. If workers are not
risk averse, early contracting can still take place as long as firms possess risk-loving utility
functions.
Matching with full information in the second period is an equilibrium under all three
information assumptions. Under Information Structure 2, the shortcomings of the equilibrium
are the same as in the symmetric information case. Since workers have no information about
signal s1 in the first period, the condition for successful early contracting are different, however.
If a worker receives an offer in the first period, she updates her beliefs about the signal s1
taking into account the offer she has received. Specifically, all realizations of s1 which would
make the early offer non-profitable for the firm will be assigned zero probability. Then, the
worker can calculate the expected utility from waiting and compare this to the proposed
match. This can be expressed more technically.
Proposition 2. A pair of firm and worker, (n, i), can deviate profitably from the equilibrium
in Proposition 1, if and only if their respective utility functions fulfill the following conditions,
(i) Under symmetric information (Information Structure 1)
u(qi) ≥
∫
u(rn)1rn>|I|dFn(rn|s1) and
∫
v(rn)dFn(rn|s1) > v(qi)
(ii) If only firms know the vector signal s1 (Information Structure 2)∫
v(r)dFn(rn|s1) > v(qi) and u(qi) ≥
∫
S?
∫
u(rn)1rn>|I|dFn(rn|s1)dG?(s1)
where
S? =
{
s1 ∈ S1|
∫
v(r)dFn(rn|s1) > v(qi)
}
and
∂
∂s1
G?(s1) =
g(s1)
1− ∫S1\S? g(s)ds
(iii) If only workers know the vector signal s1 (Information Structure 2)∫
S?
∫
v(rn)dFn(rn|s1)dG?(s1) > v(qi) and u(qi) ≥
∫
u(rn)1rn>|I|dFn(rn|s1)
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where
S? =
{
s1 ∈ S1|u(qi) ≥
∫
u(rn)dFn(rn|s1)
}
and
∂
∂s1
G?(s
1) =
g(s1)
1− ∫S1\S? g(s)ds
Proof. The following arguments applied for Information Structure 1 and 2 as well. Let us
consider the symmetric information. Suppose firm i makes an offer to worker n with expected
quality E[rn|s1]. As
∫
v(r)dFn(rn|s1) > v(qi), the firm prefers being matched to n, by
condition 1, worker n will accept the offer. If u(qi) ≥
∫
u(rn)1rn>|I|dFn(rn|s1) is not fulfilled,
a deviating firm cannot find a worker who it would prefer to being matched in the second period
and who would accept its proposal. 
If the the available information is symmetric (case (i)), the result is interesting for two
reasons. First, it shows that risk aversion by workers is not necessary for unraveling, as long as
firms are sufficiently risk-loving. Moreover, if the conditional density of rankings for workers
fn(rn|s1) is sufficiently non-degenerate, unraveling is more likely to involve firms and workers
in the middle of the ranking distribution. In this case, the expected ranking of workers are
found mainly in the middle of the ranking distribution, making early matching unattractive
for firms at the top of the distribution unless they exhibit considerable risk-seeking behavior.
By the same argument, workers are unwilling to match with low ranked firms. An implica-
tion of this observation is the role of the conditional density function fn(rn|s1). The more
information the signal s1 provides, that is, the more precise the prediction of a workers’ final
rankings is, the wider will be the distribution of expected rankings and, in consequence, the
more firms can make profitable offers in the first period that will be accepted. This suggests
that labor markets in which little information is available to potential early contractors are
less likely to exhibit unraveling.
Under asymmetric information and if only the firms observe the signal s1, unless the offer
originates with the lowest ranked firm, Proposition 2 implies that a worker having received
an offer revises her expected ranking upwards. Moreover, the higher the rank of the propos-
ing firm, the higher the expected ranking conditional on the offer. This has two important
consequences. A worker who would have accepted an out of equilibrium offer from a firm
under the symmetric information assumption, might no longer accept as she forms unrealistic
but rational beliefs about her expected ranking. In that sense, withholding information from
workers may reduce the likelihood of early contracting and the unraveling of the market. At
the same time, however, an offer by a lower ranked firm might convince a worker that his
expected ranking is lower than it actually is, leading her to accept an offer she would not
have considered under symmetric information. The effect of asymmetric information on the
incidence of early contracting is thus not obvious. Since firms possess all relevant information
in the first period, the early contracting equilibrium also exists when workers do not know the
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signal vector s1. Furthermore, the same coalition or a high-ranked firm and a lower ranked
worker can deviate. The reason for this is that in equilibrium the firms’ offers reveal enough
information about the realization of s1 to the workers for them to face incentives similar to
the symmetric case.
Let us now consider Information Structure 2 where the workers get the signal. Not sur-
prisingly these conditions are in a sense the opposite from the case where firms possess more
information than workers. In order for a firm to make an offer to a worker, it has to evaluate
the information it obtains from the decision to accept – or not – by the worker. An acceptance
is then almost bad news since it implies that the ranking the worker expects is low enough
for her to accept, and the firm updates its belief about the probabilities a particular signal s1
was received by the workers.
Despite the similarities between all three information structures, there does seem to be
one important difference. When the signal vector s1 and the preferences of workers are
common knowledge, firms can identify workers in the first period who would accept an out of
equilibrium offer. Similarly, when only firms have information about s1, they can find workers
for who the conditions necessary for early contracting are met. Their proposal then signals
to the worker that accepting might be in their own best interest. In contrast, if firms have
no information, they might not be able to identify a potential early-matching partner, even
though they know that she exists. The crucial difference between the two asymmetric cases
is thus the information available to the proposing party. Indeed, if workers rather than firms
took the initiative in early contracting the result would be reversed.
4 Unraveling Equilibrium Strategies
With unraveling possibly being a problem, all agents matching in the first period may be
an equilibrium in the labor market with symmetric information. The following proposition
describes the equilibrium strategies under the assumption |I| = |N |.
Proposition 3. Assume firms and workers are both observing the vector of signal s1. There
exists a Nash equilibrium in which firms make offers in period 1 and all workers accept, that
is, for all i ∈ I, n ∈ N and s1 ∈ S1,
σi(m|s1) = 1
where m ∈ N such that qi = r(E[rm|s1]),
σn(j|s1) = 1
where j = argminj∈I qj subject to σj(n|s1) = 1.
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Proof. Three types of deviations are potentially profitable. First, a firm i can make an offer to
a worker m such that qi > r(E[rm|s1]). Since this worker will also receive an offer from a firm
j with qj > qi, firm i’s offer will not be accepted. If all other agents follow their equilibrium
strategy, the set of unmatched agents after period 1 resulting from this deviation, U = N ′∪ I ′
consists of firm qi and worker n such that qi = r(E[rn|s1]), U = {n, i}. Second, assume worker
n employs any strategy σ′ such that σ′(j|s1) = 0 for all j with qj ≥ r(E[rn|s1]), the set of
unmatched agent after period 1 will also be U =
{
n, i|qi = r(E[rn|s1]))
}
. Similarly, if either
firm i does not make any offer, or worker n declines all offers, U =
{
n, i|qi = r(E[rn|s1]))
}
.
In all of those cases, the mechanism in period 2 will match firm i and worker n, and the
final matching is not affected at all by the deviations.

The intuition is simple. As long as only a single agent deviates and all others follow their
equilibrium strategy, the worker-firm pair that remains unmatched and will be matched to
each other in the second period is the same that would have been matched in equilibrium
anyway. Thus they cannot gain by holding out for a contract in the second period. This
argument, however, holds only if the set of unmatched agents consists only of single worker
and firm. Since the expected ranking of a worker is unlikely to be equal to her realized
ranking in period 2, if two or more workers remain unmatched after the first period, their
ranking relative to each other may change between the periods. In consequence, their final
partner may be different from their equilibrium match. This leads a possible deviation by a
coalition of a firm and a worker who are not matched in the equilibrium of Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium in Proposition 3 is not coalition proof with respect to a
coalition consisting of a firm and worker, {i, n} such that qi < r(E[rn|s1]).
Proof. Consider strategies σi(i|s1) = 1 and σn(n|s1) = 1 for the deviating firm and worker
respectively. Then, the set of unmatched agents consists of firms i and j with qi < qj and
workers n andm with r(E[rm|s1]) < r(E[rn|s1]). In equilibrium, firms i and j would have been
matched to worker m and n, respectively, µ(i) = m,µ(j) = n. The mechanism in the second
period matches the two top ranked agents with each other, so that µ(i) = argmink∈N ′ rk ≤ rm.
Hence firm i cannot lose, but possibly obtain a better match by waiting. Similarly, if rn > rm,
worker n will be matched to the same firm as in equilibrium; if rn < rm, however, n will be
matched to the higher-ranked firm. Hence worker n weakly prefers to wait for the second
period. 
Again, the intuition is straightforward. If a high-ranked firm waits and a lower ranked firm
remains unmatched, their equilibrium matches are also available in the second period. Since
the higher-ranked firm is able to obtain the worker with the higher realized rank it can only
gain by waiting. In the worst case it is matched with the worker it would have been matched
in equilibrium; in the best case the other firm’s equilibrium match turns out to be better and
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the higher-ranked firm can achieve a better match. The worker with the lower expected rank,
similarly, cannot do worse than her equilibrium match, but can be matched to the preferred
firm if her realized ranking is higher than the other worker’s. By the symmetric argument,
the lower-ranked firm and the higher ranked worker can only be made worse off.
These results suggest that there might be equilibria in which some firms match early while
others wait until the second period. As long as the set of agents waiting until period 2 consists
of only two firms and workers, Proposition 4 has shown this to be the case, indeed. It is not
possible to generalize this finding to cases where more than two agents on each side of the
market contract late. In fact, if worker preferences exhibit universal risk aversion, that is,
for any i and all s1 ∈ S1, there exists a firm n such that the conditions in Proposition 2
hold, there exists no trembling-hand perfect equilibrium with late matching by more than two
worker-firm pairs. Moreover, the only equilibrium with some firms matching in the second
period that survives trembling hand perfection for all preferences and quality distributions
is early contracting by all firms and workers but the top ranked firm and the lowest ranked
worker. For any other worker there exist a combination of preferences and type-distributions
such that she would accept a proposal by a slightly lower ranked firm in the first period.
To some extent the instability of the second-period matching equilibrium is due to the fact
that workers have as much information about their expected ranking as firms do. This allows
them to evaluate an offer in the first period without having to make an inference about their
expected ranking.
Let us now consider asymmetric information between firms and workers. If firms possess
all relevant information in the first period, the early contracting equilibrium of Proposition 3
also exists when workers do not know the signal vector s1. Furthermore, the same coalition
or a high-ranked firm and a lower ranked worker can deviate. The reason for this is that
in equilibrium the firms’ offers reveal enough information about the realization of s1 to the
workers for them to face incentives similar to the symmetric case. This is no longer true when
firms have less information than workers.
Proposition 5 shows there is also an equilibrium with early matching under Information
Structure 2 when only workers know the vector of signals s1. Unless the conditional densities
fn(rn|s1) are identical for all workers, firms can arrive at an expected ranking in period 1
even though they lack information about s1.
Proposition 5. Assume workers are perfectly informed about the vector of signal s1. If
fn(rn|s1) 6= fm(rn|s1) ∀n,m ∈ N , there exists a Nash equilibrium in which firms make offers
in period 1 and all workers accept. The equilibrium strategies are as follows. For all i ∈ I,
n ∈ N and s1 ∈ S1,
σi(m) = 1
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where m ∈ N such that qi = r(E[rm]),
σn(j|s1) = 1
where j = argminj∈I qj subject to σj(n|s1) = 1.
Proof. The proof follows the proof of Proposition 3. 
If firms cannot distinguish the expected quality of worker, that is if fn(rn|s1) = f(rn|s1),
this equilibrium no longer exists. There does exist an equilibrium with complete contracting in
the first period, however. Firms make random offers and workers accept the highest offer they
receive. Yet such an outcome is not attractive since it does not use all information available,
even if it is only to one of the parties. Given that workers receive (and accept) an offer
from a firm below their expected ranking with non-zero probability, they have an incentive
to communicate information about s1 to the firms.12 Moreover, random contracting implies
that firms and workers with expected rankings above the median would prefer matching to
be restricted to the second period ex-ante. This raises the question about possible deviations
from an equilibrium with contracting in period 1.
Proposition 6. The equilibrium in Proposition 5 is not coalition proof with respect to a
coalition consisting of a firm and worker, {i, n} such that qi < r(E[rn|s1]).
Proof. Since the deviating coalition and its strategy is independent of the information struc-
ture, its existence is not affected by firms’ inability to observe s1 and the proof follows Propo-
sition 4. 
As with the other information structures, the existence of equilibria with partial early
contracting depends on the utility functions of workers and firms and without further param-
eterizing the model little can be said.
5 Conclusion
Unraveling, that is contracting before the official opening of a market, has been a major
problem in many real world labor markets. Although this phenomenon may have different
reasons, it is generally considered undesirable by the participants in the affected markets
(Roth and Xing, 1994). Several authors (see Suen (2000) and Li and Suen (2000, 2004)), have
provided theoretical justifications for early contracting, focusing mainly on early contracting
as a mechanism to insure against uncertainties in the distribution of surplus from the matching
of workers to firms. Risk aversion is thus a crucial aspect of unraveling in labor markets. The
present analysis differs in that firms and workers do not match in order to produce output and
12Communication between workers and firms, other than related to contracts, are ruled out in this model.
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that information can be asymmetric. We determine that asymmetric information matters in
early contracting process and understand how it is related to risk aversion.
This paper provides a general framework to examine the effect of risk aversion on early
contracting under three different assumptions about the distribution of information between
firms and workers. A two period labor market is considered in which workers’ quality is
revealed in the second period. A signal – revealed to either workers, firms or both at the
beginning of the first period – is correlated with the final quality. Preferences over firms
are common knowledge and identical for all workers. Although very formalized, this setup
reflects the characteristics of many labor markets, where there is general agreement over the
desirability of a match and where information about workers is revealed over time through
exams, perhaps, or the production of job relevant material such as dissertations or portfolios.
Under all assumptions about the distribution of information in the first period there exists
an equilibrium in which firms only make offers in the second and workers accept no offer in
the first period. As a result all matching takes place under full information. Though desirable
from the perspective of efficiency, this equilibrium is not realistic. Since the rejection of
all offers in the first period as well as the refusal to make any offers are weakly dominated
strategies the resulting equilibrium is not trembling hand perfect. Alternative equilibrium
strategies are suggested which include offers in the first period. Nonetheless, early contracting
is only an equilibrium outcome if certain conditions on preferences of firms and workers are
met. Loosely speaking, workers have to be risk averse or firms risk loving with respect to
expectations appropriate to the relevant information structure. That is, the conditions for
unraveling depend on the information available to the two sides of the market.
In a second equilibrium firms and workers match in the first period. Since the final rank-
ings of workers are not known at the time the offers are made and accepted, firms use the
information implicit in the signal to make an offer. Then the worker with the nth highest
expected ranking will be matched to the nth highest ranked firm. As long as firms are able
to obtain an expected ranking of workers this equilibrium survives even if they do not possess
information about the signal. As the matching is based on expected rankings it is generally
not efficient and not stable ex-post. Moreover, the equilibrium is not coalitionnally stable, as a
high ranked firm and a low ranked worker can profitably deviate by not matching in the first
period. The existence of larger deviating coalitions depends on preferences and the densities
of the stochastic process, as does the existence of equilibria with partial matching in both
periods.
The generality of the analysis, while making precise conclusions elusive, allows the frame-
work to be adapted for further research. First, parameterizing the density functions of the
signal and the final quality may allow clearer predictions in the context of the two period
matching model. More interestingly perhaps, the effect of the protocol for making and re-
acting to offers under different information assumptions can be examined. If firms have no
information about worker quality, for example, allowing workers to apply rather than wait for
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offers might lead to a different set of equilibria. Finally, and probably the most important
future research could be about welfare maximization. In our current analysis we do not know
which information structure is welfare maximizing. That implies to determine which informa-
tion structure is ex-ante better to preclude unraveling and then leads to ex-post efficiency. A
such analysis would be an interesting companion paper of Halaburda (2010) who determines
that some mechanisms are Pareto optimal in markets where unraveling can occur. As a con-
sequence, this investigation would have important policy implications on market design, as
well as on the interaction rules in the labor market.
References
Becker, G. (1981), A treatise on the family, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Damiano, E., Li, H. and Suen, W. (2005), ‘Unravelling of dynamic sorting’, Review of Eco-
nomics Studies 72, 1057–1076.
Fainmesser, I. (2011), Social networks and unraveling in labor markets. Working Paper.
Galichon, A. (2012), Ex-ante vs. ex-post efficiency in matching. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1837321.
Halaburda, H. (2010), ‘Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of prefer-
ences’, Games and Economic Behavior 69, 365–393.
Li, H. and Rosen, S. (1998), ‘Unraveling in matching markets’, American Economic Review
88, 371–387.
Li, H. and Suen, W. (2000), ‘Risk sharing, sorting, and early contracting’, Journal of Political
Economy 108, 1058–1087.
Li, H. and Suen, W. (2004), ‘Self-fulfilling early-contracting rush’, International Economic
Review 34, 301–324.
Niederle, M. and Roth, A. E. (2009), ‘Market culture: How norms governing exploding offers
affect market performance’, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 1(199–219).
Ostrovsky, M. and Schwarz, M. (2010), ‘Information disclosure and unraveling in matching
markets’, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, 34–63.
Roth, A. E. and Sotomayor, M. (1990), Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic
Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Roth, A. E. and Xing, X. (1994), ‘Jumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to
the timing of market transactions’, American Economic Review 84, 992–1044.
18
Suen, W. (2000), ‘A competitive theory of equilibrium and disequilibrium unravelling in two-
sided matching’, Rand Journal of Economics 31, 101–120.
19
